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A specter is haunting political science. It is the specter of
methodological perfectionism.1 This dogma places methods
before substance and imposes a narrow spectrum of accept-
able methods on the discipline.2
There are of course many varieties of methodological per-
fectionism, and political science has experienced more than a
few over the past century. Methodologists from the “statisti-
cal” side of the discipline (aka PolMeth, quantitative methods)
generally prize causal knowledge over descriptive knowledge,
theory appraisal over theory discovery, micro-theory (aka mi-
cro-mechanisms) over macro-theory, and internal validity over
external validity.
Methodologists from the “qualitative” (aka case study,
QCA) side of the discipline share most of these preferences,
with the notable exception of theory appraisal. (They value
work that is exploratory rather than confirmatory.) I will not
address qualitative work in the interpretive tradition, as this
tradition—while it certainly has its own version of perfection—
is not as influential at the present time.
So defined, both the quant and qual side of the method-
ological divide agree on the nature of the problem we are fac-
ing today. Broadly stated, the most common method of draw-
ing causal inferences in social science—based on large samples
with no pretense of a randomized treatment (“regression”)—
does not work. Consequently, we need to re-think the tradi-
tional approach to causality.
For those trained in statistics, the way forward is to be
found in experimental or quasi-experimental evidence. Any im-
perfections in the assignment process or in the post-treatment
period should be handled by appropriate statistical proce-
dures—via matching, instrumental variables, regression-dis-
continuity models, and the like (Angrist and Pischke 2010;
Gerber, Green, and Kaplan 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009;
Morgan and Winship 2007; Rubin 2005).
For those trained in qualitative methods, the way forward
lies in case-based methods, e.g., (a) tracing a discrete process
from the purported cause, through its various mechanisms, to
an effect, (b) causal-process observations, (c) counterfactual
thought-experiments, (d) well-matched cases that satisfy the
strictures of a most-similar or most-different case design, or (e)
comparative-historical work, which combines elements of the
foregoing (Bennett 2010; Bennett and Elman 2006; Brady and
Collier 2010; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; Mahoney
2000, 2010; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer  2003).
Many methodologists embrace both of these solutions
(e.g., Freedman 2008; Seawright 2010), as do I.3 Indeed, quali-
tative evidence is often quite important for conducting a strong
experimental or quasi-experimental design (Cook et al. 2010;
Dunning 2008b; Paluck 2010; Rosenbaum 2010: 323–24). I do
not want to portray these two solutions as necessarily in con-
flict with one another. Nonetheless, they are quite distinct ap-
proaches to causal inference, and I shall treat them as such.
I want to propose that both the experimental and case-
based approaches to causal inference are valid, but—here are
the crucial caveats—only if understood as ideals rather than
uniform thresholds of adequacy, and only if understood within
the larger context of methodological objectives and tools that
have traditionally been applied to questions of social science
(and new tools that are now entering the lexicon, such as ran-
domization inference and extreme bounds analysis). The costs
of adopting stricter methodological standards must be reck-
oned along with the benefits. Tradeoffs—e.g., between causal
and descriptive knowledge, theory appraisal and theory dis-
covery, micro-theory and macro-theory, internal and external
validity—are inescapable.
Let us consider these costs in somewhat more detail. (This
ground has been covered many times, but some mention of
these issues is important in order to properly frame the main
argument.) Although experiments usually achieve a high de-
gree of internal validity, there is often a sacrifice in external
validity or in the type of problems that can be addressed.4
Natural experiments are wonderful tools but are limited to cir-
cumstances of extraordinary serendipity, and are not always
easy to generalize from (Dunning 2008a). The current raft of
econometric tools are fairly easy to apply (given handy statis-
tical software packages), but do not always rectify the prob-
lems they are designed to rectify. A prime example in point is
the instrumental variables approach to causal inference, where
one often finds a facile use of a technique without any real
acknowledgment of its potential problems (e.g., violation of
the exclusion restriction).
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designs, the ingenuity of the discipline should be unleashed.
At the end of a decade or so we should be able to answer the
question that has dogged proponents of these methods all
along: what is the possible purview of such methods (i.e.,
experiments, natural experiments, and strong case-based knowl-
edge) for political science questions? And what is the value-
added for the discipline of having these first-class studies? Do
they cumulate into broader theoretical insights?
Perhaps the current evangelical spirit represents a tempo-
rary swing of the pendulum—an entirely appropriate reaction
against the traditional, regression-based species of political
science that became the hallmark of the behavioralist move-
ment. In a few years the fever may pass and we will find some
reasonable middle ground.
If this is what the future holds, we need to start thinking
about what that middle ground might consist of. And if not,
i.e., if the current methods juggernaut continues, we need to
figure out what the end-result of our collective move toward
higher quantitative and qualitative standards might be. Either
way, our subject matter is highly consequential.
I must introduce one note of clarification before proceed-
ing. The spirit of methodological perfectionism that I am de-
scribing is most noticeable among methodologists and among
those who follow current developments in the methodological
literature. Recent PhDs are likely to be more aware of these
trends than older scholars. Those who attempt to publish in
the very top mainstream journals (e.g., APSR, AJPS, JOP, BJPS,
WP) are more likely to be aware of these trends than those who
write for subfield journals or who publish books rather than
articles. Research universities are more prone to these devel-
opments than liberal arts colleges.
For some scholars, this debate may seem like a debate
from nowhere. However, insofar as the spirit of methodologi-
cal perfectionism pervades the discipline’s top journals and
top departments, it affects the direction of political science at
large. Consequently, those who feel distant from these cur-
rents may still be affected by the tide.
Messy Data
Despite frequent espousals of pluralism, methodologists
seem to agree that there is one category of endeavor that does
not deserve forbearance. This excluded category may be de-
scribed as large-N observational research where the treat-
ment bears no resemblance to randomized assignment, where
the assignment principle is not known, where there are no
good instruments, and where there is no opportunity for con-
vincing process-tracing.
This mouthful is sometimes subsumed under the rubric of
“regression.” However, regression methods are often used for
the analysis of experimental data and quasi-experimental data.
Moreover, other (non-regression) estimators—e.g., difference
of means tests, matching, randomization inference—can be
used to analyze large-N samples of the sort described above.
In truth, the blighted patch of desert described by the
passage in italics is a residual category. It includes any re-
search design that doesn’t pass either the quantitative (experi-
mental/quasi-experimental) or qualitative (case-based) thresh-
Likewise, case-based causal inference is easy to practice
but hard to practice well. Confounders are generally legion,
even in carefully matched cases (the most-similar form of com-
parison), and counterfactual thought-experiments are not al-
ways sufficient to eliminate them. Strong process tracing re-
search usually depends on strong and specific theoretical pre-
dictions about the causal mechanisms at work. However, most
social-science theories do not issue highly specific predic-
tions about process and outcome, or they specify a number of
possible mechanisms, none of which is necessary for Y (causal
equifinality). Likewise, strong process-tracing is usually pos-
sible only with proximal causal relationships; distal causes,
which compose a large share of social science theories, are
difficult to process-trace. The question, to adopt the vocabu-
lary employed by Bennett (2010), is how often Hoop tests,
Smoking Gun tests, or Doubly Decisive tests can be applied to
case study evidence. Is this a realistic standard of evidence for
most case studies? (Bennett [2010: 219] specifies, “The evi-
dence must strongly discriminate between alternative hypo-
theses.”) Likewise, do case studies claiming to have applied
these tests do so with integrity? Just as it is important to ques-
tion dubious assertions about “natural experiments,” it is im-
portant to question assertions of slam-dunk process-tracing.
And even when internal validity can be established, it is often
difficult to generalize from a case study.5
What worries me is that, insofar as our discipline’s current
experimental and case-based standards are taken seriously (i.e.,
interpreted strictly), a very high bar is being set for admission
into the ranks of political science, a standard that only a small
minority of work currently satisfies (and that much of my own
work certainly does not). This sort of methodological perfec-
tionism puts researchers in a situation where they may (a)
pretend that they have attained methodological purity when
they have not (in order to convince colleagues and reviewers),
(b) privately feel morose about their work, and/or (c) abandon
their substantive/theoretical goals in favor of things that might
be studied in a way that satisfies current standards. None of
these developments are especially healthy for the discipline—
not to mention for the individuals involved.
Of course, one might argue that a surge of methodological
extremism is precisely what is needed at the present time, as a
tonic. If lots of what we currently do does not pass the more
exacting standards that the discipline has adopted, it could be
a sign that we need to buckle up and work harder, and learn
some new tricks—not that we should relax our standards. And
if current methods are not working very well because the na-
ture of the data on certain subjects is recalcitrant, perhaps it
makes sense to reallocate our energies towards problems that
are more tractable. To this extent, methods may legitimately
drive substance (i.e., in situations where little progress can be
made on Subject A and lots of progress on Subject B).
The advent of experimental and quasi-experimental stan-
dards has had the salutary effect of raising methodological
consciousness in the discipline (a good thing, from most per-
spectives) and has resulted in some superb work (a good thing,
from all perspectives). And now that incentives of political
scientists are strongly aligned to promote first-class research
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olds of adequacy, and whose purpose is causal inference (not
merely description). I shall refer to this nebulous area hence-
forth as large-N observational data, aka messy data. Assume
by this phrase that violations of stable unit treatment value
assumption (SUTVA) and ignorability are serious concerns;
confounders cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the internal valid-
ity of the study is seriously challenged. Perhaps most worri-
some of all, the researcher has no way of determining whether
the assumptions necessary for causal inference have been met
unless a parallel experiment has been carried out. Thus, the
only time we can be pretty sure that messy large-N observa-
tional research is accurate is when it is redundant.6
In the face of such damning conclusions, it is easy to see
why there has been a flight by methodologists from large-N
observational data to other approaches. David Freedman (1997:
114; emphasis added) states baldly, “I see no cases in which
regression equations, let alone the more complex methods,
have succeeded as engines for discovering causal relation-
ships.” While this may be viewed as somewhat extreme, Freed-
man articulates a widely-held skepticism toward causal analy-
ses based on ex post statistical adjustments. Of late, regres-
sion has become the whipping-boy of methodologists, both
quant and qual. It is perhaps the only area of agreement one
finds today that stretches across the entire methodological
spectrum—from positivism (so-called) to interpretivism (so-
called).7 A sign of this new consensus is that it has become a
sign of sophistication to scoff at “correlations” and to de-
scribe them as “descriptive” or as “stylized facts.”
Let me be clear. I have no argument with these critiques.
However, I want to argue that Freedman’s conclusion is wrong.
More important, I want to argue that it misframes the question
we ought to be asking.
Let me now utter a few platitudes that I assume most read-
ers will be willing to entertain, at least as a point of departure.
1. We learn about the world in myriad ways—including
common sense, personal experience, secondary research
(conducted by others), theoretical suppositions, deduc-
tive logic, exploratory data analysis, and (last and per-
haps least) formally devised research designs. Of these,
some conform to the current template of acceptable re-
search, while most do not.
2. Different problems demand different approaches, and
political science encompasses an extraordinarily broad set
of theoretical frameworks and empirical data.
3. Where others have been to some extent determines
where it might be fruitful to go. A good research design is
understandable only in the context of a particular research
tradition, where triangulation on a common problem is
often useful.
If readers are willing to accept these truisms, it follows that no
single methodological standard is likely to be applicable to all
political science work (unless that standard is extremely ab-
stract, i.e., on the level of philosophy of science). It also sug-
gests a more flexible methodological standard for work in po-
litical science, one that might include large-N observational
data analysis.
Note that many practicing political scientists continue to
employ messy observational data as their empirical workhorse.
Thus, my argument may be understood as a qualified defense
of the status quo—qualified, in the following manner.
I want to argue that the question we ought to be asking is
not whether method A or B is adequate—by some absolute
standard of adequacy—but rather (a) whether it adds to our
knowledge of a subject, (b) whether it is the best method (or
one of several equally good methods) for the job, and (c)
whether an accurate assessment of overall uncertainty (not
simply statistical uncertainty) is attached to the conclusions.
If these criteria are met, then the study ought to be considered
methodologically adequate, even if far from ideal. It follows
that a study may be extremely shaky but still adequate, so long
as it allows us to update our priors, beats the alternatives, and
presents a plausible uncertainty estimate. The slogan is best-
possible—rather than best (Gerring 2011a).
The foregoing statement pertains to methodology con-
sidered in its narrowest sense, i.e., pertaining to internal valid-
ity and precision. I would also argue that we need to find a way
to incorporate other goals into our understanding of method-
ology. This includes, most importantly, the theoretical contri-
bution of a study (its breadth of application and commensura-
bility with other work). I don’t imagine that there will be much
dissent from this argument; I raise it only so that readers can
keep it in view, and because it sometimes militates toward large-
N observational data and away from some of the more rarified
methods, which are often limited in external validity and/or
theoretical fecundity.
Messy Data at Work: Democracy as a Dependent Variable
The way to prove my point—and to prove that Freedman
is wrong—is not to engage the question at the abstract level
of philosophy or methodological theory, where complex is-
sues are usually difficult to resolve. Rather, following Freed-
man (who was fond of dissecting published work), I must show
that for some questions of importance to political science, large-
N observational data provides the best (or a best) approach to
the problem, there is some value-added to our understanding
of a subject, and reasonable estimates of uncertainty can be
arrived at (through statistical procedures such as Bayesian
inference, randomization inference, or extreme bounds and/or
through qualitative reasoning).
I shall begin with a research area that provides a tough
test for my argument: crossnational regressions with institu-
tions on the left and right side of the model. It is a tough test
because such analyses are characterized by many of the fea-
tures that lead methodologists to despair of ever reaching causal
inferences based on observational data. Institutions are broad,
abstract phenomena—democracy, development, rule of law,
property rights, veto points—that are difficult to conceptual-
ize, much less to measure. Even where they can be measured,
they are difficult to interpret causally because they are usually
not manipulable (perhaps not even in principle, although this
may be debated). Institutions tend to be slow-moving and
thus provide little change over observable periods, usually
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limited to the past half-century. Institutions are highly corre-
lated—good things go together, as do bad things—so it is
difficult to tease apart the signal from the background noise
and from potential confounders. One rarely finds quasi-experi-
mental assignment to treatment; endogeneity is the norm. Good
instruments (ones that are strongly correlated with the treat-
ment and do not affect the outcome) are rare. And the units of
interest—nation-states—are remarkably heterogeneous.
(Some might even wonder if they belong in the same sample.)
Recall, however, the burden of the argument: not that good
inferences result from such bad data but that better inferences
may result from large-N observational data analysis than from
other types of analyses. Indeed, many of the characteristics of
the typical crossnational regression also pose problems for
experimental or quasi-experimental analysis or for convincing
case-based analysis (Coppedge forthcoming: ch 5; Gerring and
Thacker 2008: ch 7; Seawright 2010). It is not clear that there is
a good alternative.
Now, let us turn to a specific example. I shall focus on an
area well known to most readers (and certainly to all com-
parativists) by virtue of the volume of work that has been
devoted to it and the prominence of the theory—moderniza-
tion. This refers to the relationship between development and
democracy, a topic first tackled in a serious way by Seymour
Martin Lipset (1959), and since explored by myriad studies,
generally in a regression framework (e.g., Boix and Stokes
2003; Casper and Tufis 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski
and Limongi 1997).
Two findings have emerged from this body of work. The
first is that development (as measured by GDP per capita) helps
democracies consolidate. The richer a democracy, the less likely
it is to relapse into authoritarian rule. The second is that devel-
opment has a very small—perhaps even nonexistent—effect
on democratization. Rich countries are only slightly more likely
to democratize than similarly situated poor countries. This sec-
ond finding is still contested, but the boundaries of the pos-
sible relationship seem clear. Development has a small or null
effect on democratization.
Our questions of interest are whether regression (i.e., large-
N observational data analysis) has added to our knowledge of
the subject, whether it is the best method (or one of several
equally good methods) for the job, and whether an accurate
assessment of overall uncertainty has been attached to the
conclusions of the cited studies. I think the answers are: yes,
yes, and probably not. Thus, in two respects messy-data meth-
ods proved their worth, though perhaps not in the third.
However, the one failing is by no means irremediable (see
Glynn, below). Indeed, it is partly a product of the method-
ological perfectionism that I am complaining about. Authors
feel compelled to present their findings as if they arose from
experimental or quasi-experimental evidence, even though they
probably know (in their heart of hearts) that their t statistics do
not encompass many threats to inference situated in the re-
search design. If I am correct in these conclusions, then a
modest case for large-N observational data has been estab-
lished, at least in one instance.
Michael Coppedge’s magisterial survey, Approaching
Democracy: Research Methods in Comparative Politics (forth-
coming), examines what we know about democratization, and
how we know it. Here, a much broader survey of the method-
ological and substantive ground is covered. Because it bears
directly on our question, I will paraphrase at some length.
Coppedge does not discuss any experimental or quasi-
experimental work, suggesting that this method has yet to be
applied (or has not been successfully applied) to the topic.
Case study work on democratization is voluminous, and
Coppedge is impressed by the rich narrative histories of spe-
cific cases as well as the number of potentially fruitful general
hypotheses that might be garnered from this corpus. However,
he also notes that there are many threats to inference, even
with respect to the cases under study (problems of internal
validity). Moreover, the broader hypotheses that might be
gleaned from the case study literature have been difficult to
generalize from because they are developed in the context of
specific cases and are not always couched in ways that would
lend themselves to broader application. Coppedge concludes
that theory generation, not theory testing, is the province of
case studies in the area of democratization. “Histories and
case studies are great ways to develop ideas about things that
may matter generally, but cannot show that they do matter
generally” (Coppedge forthcoming: 18–19, chap. 5).
For theory testing, Coppedge concludes that crossnational
statistical analysis is required—even though it may not al-
ways be sufficient, for all the reasons we have discussed (and
which Coppedge discusses in much greater detail). Likewise,
Coppedge criticizes crossnational analyses for their lack of
theoretical integration: researchers settle on slightly different
operationalizations, samples, and/or estimators and, as a re-
sult, their findings do not cumulate. Nonetheless, he hazards
the following conclusions, based on his reading of the litera-
ture (and his own analyses). Factors that seem to have little
impact on any democracy outcome include “land area, popula-
tion, age of the country, the rule of law (as currently mea-
sured), colonial rule (without differentiating among colonial
powers), and linguistic fragmentation.” Factors that have some
impact on at least one outcome measure of democracy, and
have been confirmed by multiple studies and extensive ro-
bustness tests, are summarized as follows:
Income (the log of per capita GDP) is associated with higher
cross-national levels of democracy; income and economic
growth are both associated with a higher probability of
survival as a democracy and a lower probability of transi-
tion. Greater absolute changes in level and a higher prob-
ability of breakdown are found in the more unequal soci-
eties. Rentier states tend to be less democratic. And reli-
giously fragmented societies are less stable: more likely to
experience both transitions and breakdowns. (chap. 9: 56–
57, draft version)
In addition, Coppedge identifies a number of factors whose
effects are robust, though difficult to interpret. This includes
“the core vs. periphery distinction, the proportion of demo-
cratic neighbors, the distinction between capitalist and com-
munist economies, the number of past regime transitions, a
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British colonial legacy, regional dummies, and the most opaque
of all, the lagged dependent variable.”
Coppedge concludes that crossnational analysis of de-
mocratization is still in its infancy. This might be interpreted as
a pessimistic commentary for a field that has been running
regressions for five decades, or as an optimistic view of things
still to be discovered, depending upon one’s point of view. In
any case, even if we take as given only the conclusions war-
ranted by extant research—as summarized by Coppedge’s
painstaking and comprehensive review—it is still something
of an achievement, given the difficulties of the subject matter.
More to the point, it is a lot more than we have learned from
other approaches. To this extent, and with all the usual cave-
ats, messy data analysis is vindicated.
Messy Data at Work:
Democracy as an Independent Variable
Let us now consider a slightly different question, where
democracy lies on the right side of a causal model. Seawright
(2010) claims that regression has made no contribution to the
question of democracy’s relationship to growth. He says (echo-
ing the common wisdom) that no hypothesis is robust to all
plausible estimators and specifications and all “positive” (sta-
tistically significant) findings are subject to potential confound-
ers.
My own view is that democracy shows a strongly posi-
tive relationship to growth if measured in a non-dichotomous
and historical fashion (Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno
2005; Persson and Tabellini 2009). However, let us lay that
argument aside, as it is not addressed by Seawright’s other-
wise admirably comprehensive review. I agree with Seawright’s
(and others’) conclusions, so far as they go. As convention-
ally operationalized, there is no robust and plausible relation-
ship between democracy and growth. Is this not useful knowl-
edge? Have we not updated our priors? To put the point some-
what differently, do we know anything more about the theo-
retical question of interest after having looked at the cross-
national data? I submit that we have learned quite a lot.
I want to bang on this drum a little while longer. Suppose
a policymaker is interested to know whether there might be a
relationship between democracy and growth. He comes to you,
the resident comparativist, for recommendations of studies
that s/he should take a look at. Seawright’s advice would seem
to be the following: “Read only case studies, avoid all large-N
crossnational studies, and hope that someone, someday, fig-
ures out a way to study this in an experimental or quasi-experi-
mental fashion.” I doubt that this is sage advice.
Note that if there were a reasonably strong (and therefore
practically and theoretically relevant) causal relationship be-
tween democracy and growth one would expect it to appear in
crossnational empirical tests and to be at least somewhat stable
across various (plausible) robustness tests. The fact that it
does not (when democracy is operationalized in the conven-
tional fashion) is informative. One is much less inclined to
believe the thesis. Indeed, failing to disprove a null hypoth-
esis is often just as useful as proving a hypothesis, even though
it is difficult to do so in a definitive fashion (because proving a
null hypothesis means, in effect, disproving any possible rela-
tionship between X and Y, an argument that must take into
account all possible forms that a relationship might take).
Now, let us approach the question from another angle.
The critique of large-N observational data would be trenchant
if a viable alternative were available. However, Seawright
equivocates on this point. He suggests scaling down our theo-
retical ambitions to examine causal mechanisms—factors pre-
dicted to lie in between democracy and growth. Yet, the only
empirical example of this sort of work that is cited (Baum and
Lake 2003) is also a regression analysis—a fact that Seawright
notes, disapprovingly. Moreover, Seawright lays out a number
of methodological difficulties that such mechanismic studies
are likely to face. One is left to wonder whether or not there is
a viable alternative to the crossnational regression in this par-
ticular instance.
It so happens that I have participated in a case-study
endeavor to show causal mechanisms lying within the democ-
racy (stock) and growth relationship (Gerring, Kingstone,
Lange, and Sinha 2011). We found it a useful exercise. But it
was certainly not without its methodological difficulties, and it
certainly did not meet the test of inferential validity that case
study researchers aspire to. So, again, I found that an available
method added to the sum total of human knowledge on our
subject but lay very far from the methodological standards
currently being advocated.
Robustness Tests
Critics of messy observational data point out that results
are generally unstable when slight changes are made in the
measurement of key variables, the specification of a model, or
the chosen estimator (including corrections for autocorrelation
and the like). Robustness tests show few robust results, and
virtually no stable results (where the coefficient on a key vari-
able of interest remains stable). Under the circumstances, it
seems clear that coefficients and standard errors are not to be
taken literally. This is especially true for the cursed format of
the crossnational regression, for all the reasons we have dis-
cussed (Kittel 2006; Rodrik 2005; Seawright 2010; Summers
1991; Treisman 2007). Because we don’t know which (if any)
operationalization, specification, and estimator correctly mod-
els the data generation process (DGP), we are at sea.
Critics are right to be skeptical of studies that show only
one empirical test for an argument. Appeals to “theory” are
generally not very convincing. (Note that if the theory is strong
there is little point in testing; we already know what’s out
there. If the theory is weak, we are not strengthening our faith
in assumptions by appealing to it.) Usually, there are a variety
of plausible ways to model the DGP. However, the researcher
typically only shows a subset of these possibilities (one sus-
pects that alternative models have been suppressed, by virtue
of their non-corroborating results). This is a serious problem.
Consequently, consumers are not in a good position to judge
the veracity of an argument based on messy observational
data, unless they have played with the data themselves.
Yet, this final clause suggests something important. Im-
partial examinations of the data generally reveal that some rela-
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tionships are more robust than others. Of course, this could be
the product of persistent X/Y endogeneity, unmeasured con-
founders, a biased sample, and so forth. Robustness tests will
never offer the explicit demonstration of causality that is pro-
vided by experimental or superb case-based analysis. And they
will never provide a precise estimate of X’s impact on Y. The
purpose, rather, is to test whether a very generally stated
hypothesis—conceptualized vaguely as “positive” or “nega-
tive”—is likely to be true or not.
With this modest objective in mind robustness tests are
more than just window dressing. Note that although few re-
sults withstand all possible and plausible robustness tests,
some are more robust than others. These results deserve to be
taken very seriously—provided they are plausible (knowing
what we know about the world). As an example, one might
return to the relationship between development and demo-
cratic consolidation. Here is a result that seems unlikely to go
away, no matter how much researchers torture the data. Like-
wise, weaker results—those that are fragile in the face of
robustness tests, such as the relationship between develop-
ment and democratization—deserve to be treated with greater
skepticism. This does not mean they should be dismissed; it
means simply that the estimate must be surrounded by very
large confidence intervals.
This is more—much more—than nothing. Note that all
causal inference is based on assumptions. (Even experiments
rest on assumptions, though they are much fewer and usually
less problematic.) In the words of Donald Rubin,
Causal inference is impossible without making assump-
tions, and they are the strands that link statistics to sci-
ence. It is the scientific quality of those assumptions, not
their existence, that is critical. There is always a trade-off
between assumptions and data—both bring information.
With better data, fewer assumptions are needed. But in
the causal inference setting, assumptions are always
needed, and it is imperative that they be explicated and
justified. One reason for providing this detail is so that
readers can understand the basis of conclusions. A re-
lated reason is that such understanding should lead to
scrutiny of the assumptions, investigation of them, and,
ideally, improvements. Sadly, this stating of assumptions
is typically absent in many analyses purporting to be
causal and replaced by a statement of what computer pro-
grams were run.8
Robustness tests are tests of assumptions, usually understood
by reference to a benchmark model (which the researcher con-
siders to represent the most plausible rendering of the DGP).
The purpose of each test is to verify the main finding under
slightly different assumptions. If the finding holds, it is con-
sidered robust.9
Conclusions
This short opinion-piece has discussed only one type of
large-N observational data inference, where countries serve as
units of analysis. Evidently, I have not offered anything like a
comprehensive review of this gargantuan subject. Yet, if messy
data offers a viable strategy in crossnational analysis, which
might be considered the worst-case scenario for causal infer-
ence, it ought to be viable in other settings.
Thus, I submit that large-N observational research where
the treatment bears no resemblance to randomized assignment
and where there is no opportunity for process-tracing or strong
causal-process observations has made a fundamental contri-
bution to some areas of political science research.10 Plausibly,
it may continue to do so. But it will do so in a productive
fashion only if its achievements are recognized and if reason-
able standards for publication are accepted by the discipline.
If not, I fear that broad questions like the relationship of devel-
opment to democracy will go unanswered—or will be answered
only by journalists and amateur prognosticators. And if this
occurs, the cause of truth will be set back immeasurably. Per-
haps social science will be purer, more scientific (from a certain
angle). But it will be less consequential. And society will not
be well-served.
Methodologists who are depressed about the uncertainty
of knowledge in political science would do well to contemplate
the field of archaeology. Here, researchers are in a much worse
position vis-à-vis the things they want to find out (presum-
ably, exactly the same sort of things that social scientists wish
to find out about contemporary society). Their subjects are
long-departed, leaving few remains. All is conjecture. Yet, this
does not stop archaeologists from drawing conclusions—how-
ever tentative—about their subject. And these conclusions
are generally regarded as an advance over popular myths about
the past (though they may incorporate myths as a form of
evidence).11
Likewise, the difficulties presented by observational data
should not prevent political scientists from drawing conclu-
sions about causality—with the critical caveat that those con-
clusions be framed with appropriate confidence intervals. As
Christopher Achen (1982: 77–78) has observed, all evidence is
descriptive, for causation is an inferential form of knowledge.
Even experiments don’t speak for themselves.
It is true, of course, that drawing inferences based on
weak data is perilous. High uncertainty means that conclu-
sions will often be wrong—less than 50% of the time, one
would hope, but a lot of the time nonetheless. One must pon-
der carefully the ramifications of giving bad policy advice based
on messy data analysis. Bad policies may be pursued, lives
may be lost, and the credibility of social science may suffer
accordingly. This fear prompts some researchers to identify
scientific virtue with reticence. Professors should speak only
when they are pretty certain of an answer. Otherwise, they
should keep mum.
Sometimes it is important to resist the temptation to prog-
nosticate, i.e., to insist that we do not know the answer to a
question, however important that question might be. The flip
side of the coin is that by refusing to engage questions of
public concern, members of the academy withdraw from the
debate. The questions do not go away, nor do the—quite pos-
sibly faulty—answers. Likewise, the policies persist, based on
those faulty answers.
Suppose that political scientists, as a group, decide to
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take a principled stand on the question of democratization by
resolutely insisting on our ignorance. That is, we do not know
why countries democratize, much less how to promote this
process. We are prepared to tell you why extant studies are
faulty, or at least highly uncertain. But we are not prepared to
say which policies the U.S., or any other country, might pursue
in order to foster political freedoms in the world because there
is no secure causal knowledge on this question. Is this a re-
sponsible position to take?
Moral philosophers sometimes distinguish between
“negative” and “positive” duties. The first is our duty is to
avoid inflicting harm on others. The second is our duty to do
good (e.g., to alleviate suffering where we can do so). If one
subscribes to this distinction, the harm caused by doing harm
is much greater than the corresponding harm caused by not
doing good. From this perspective, the idea of a social-scien-
tific Hippocratic oath—i.e., pronounce only on issues where
there are high levels of certainty—is appealing.
Yet, in the policy sphere the distinction between negative
and positive duties is difficult to sustain. It is not clear, for
example, that withdrawing assistance to democratization pro-
cesses around the world would be a virtuous act. It is not even
clear what such a withdrawal would consist of. Countries must
have foreign policies, unless they are to withdraw entirely from
the world, and any foreign policy will presumably have some
effect on the pace and progress of democratization. It is diffi-
cult to construct a neutral foreign policy because in not taking
a position on democratization a country still has a causal effect
on that outcome. This means that for a policy science such as
political science, it would be difficult to define and maintain a
principled stance of “doing no harm.” Likewise, we are not a
sect of priests whose moral purity is more important than the
well being of society at large, so a deontological (person-cen-
tered) morality is in the end difficult to justify.
Of course, there is an argument for reticence if uncertainty
is too complicated a notion to communicate to the general
public or to policymakers. These consumers of political sci-
ence look to academics for certainty and are illprepared, either
psychologically or professionally, for confidence intervals. No
matter how carefully advice is tendered, no matter how many
caveats are attached, the message will be transmitted in the
popular media as “Professor A says X causes Y, and we should
follow policy Z.”
And yet, I do not see a way around it. We cannot, in good
conscience, avoid communicating the knowledge that we pos-
sess about pressing issues of the day if they touch upon our
area of expertise, even if our knowledge is based on messy
data, and hence highly uncertain, and even if there is a risk that
it might be misinterpreted and thereby lead to bad policies.
Let us return to the main argument briefly, so as to reca-
pitulate and to clear up any misconceptions. Experiments, quasi-
experiments, and slam-dunk case-based evidence are strongly
preferred wherever viable, as they generally provide superior
internal validity. It is my hope that political scientists will find
ingenious ways to widen the applicability of these methods to
questions that animate the field.
But where they are (a) impossible to implement, (b) of
questionable internal or external validity, or (c) irrelevant for
building general theory or addressing questions of public con-
cern, these Grade A methods must be supplemented or re-
placed by other methods, crude those they may be. This large
class of Grade B methods may be categorized broadly as large-
N observational research, aka messy data analysis.
Thus, I propose one cheer—perhaps even two cheers—
for this much-maligned but hardy breed of causal strategies.
Messy data is often the least-bad of all feasible alternatives.
And for this, it should be honored.
The problem is that political scientists have generally as-
sumed that there is, or ought to be, one standard of causal
inference with a very high level of certainty (say, 90% or 95%)
applying to all work in the field. This is an unrealistic standard
if we are to continue to pursue the panoply of diverse causal
questions that have traditionally motivated the field—and that
seem to have great policy and practical significance. Lower
standards of certainty are required for some questions that are
not amenable to Grade A methods.
Likewise, those who work with messy data need to muster
the courage to state honestly and forthrightly the high level of
uncertainty that usually accompanies their causal inferences.
Do not simply recite the t statistic and p value. Messy data
calls for grappling with research design issues that are not
summarizable with asterisks.
Notes
1 Many of the points in this short essay are dealt with in a more
detailed (and more nuanced) manner in Gerring (2011b). My thanks
to Taylor Boas, Jake Bowers, Michael Coppedge, Adam Glynn, Evan
Lieberman, Jay Seawright, and David Waldner for their feedback on
earlier versions of this polemic. Needless to say, they are not to be
implicated in the argument.
2 The subordination of substantive arguments to methodological
considerations is discussed in Mead (2010), Shapiro (2005), and
Smith (2003).
3 I have written a book on case study methods (Gerring 2007) and
am a strong proponent of experimental and quasi-experimental meth-
ods (Gerring 2011a).
4 These and other issues are addressed in Deaton (2010), Harrington
(2000), Heckman (2010), Humphreys and Weinstein (2009), Leamer
(2010), Lieberson and Horwich (2008), Scriven (2008).
5 Difficulties of case-based knowledge are discussed in Gerring
(2007), King and Powell (2008), Lieberson (1991), Sekhon (2004).
6 Various studies comparing analyses of the same phenomenon
with experimental and non-experimental data show significant dis-
parities in results, offering direct evidence that observational research
is flawed (e.g., Benson and Hartz 2000; Friedlander and Robins 1995;
Glazerman, Levy, and Myers 2003; LaLonde 1986). Cook, Shaddish,
and Wong (2008) offer a more optimistic appraisal.
7 Achen (2005), Berk (2004), Brady and Collier (2010), Clogg and
Haritou (1997), Freedman (1991, 1997, 2010), Gerber, Green,  and
Kaplan (2004), Gigerenzer (2004), Heckman (2000; 2008: 3), Kittel
(2006), Longford (2005), Rodrik (2005), Schrodt (2006), Seawright
(2010), Summers (1991).
8 Rubin (2005: 324). See also Day and Kincaid (1994), Freedman
(2008), Garfinkel (1981), Heckman (2008: 3), Robins and Wasserman
(1999), Rosenbaum (1999, 2005).
9 Bartels (1997), Imbens (2003), Leamer (1983), Levine and Renelt
(1992), Montgomery and Nyhan (2010), Rosenbaum (2002), Rosen-
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baum and Rubin (1983), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Sims (1988), Western
(1995), Young (2009). Note that my understanding of a “robustness”
test incorporates both alternative specifications (the usual focus of
extreme bounds analysis and sensitivity testing) and alternative esti-
mators (as discussed in most econometrics texts), as well as various
operationalizations for key variables (X, Y, C). Any important as-
sumption underlying an empirical model that can be tested by altering
some element of that model ought to be included in a set of robustness
tests.
10 Here, my conclusions echo the traditional wisdom, as articulated
by Laitin (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2008).
11 Consider if an archaeologist were to discover a cross-cultural
dataset of the sort that comparativists wrestle with—a first-century
World Development Indicators. Presumably, he or she would be thrilled,
and our knowledge of the first-century AD would be dramatically
advanced.
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Regression’s Weaknesses and Strengths:
A Reply to Gerring
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First, instability invites the tempting but unjustified infer-
ence that the true relationship of interest is weak. Gerring’s
commentary provides an example of this interpretation:
…if there were a reasonably strong (and therefore practi-
cally and theoretically relevant) causal relationship be-
tween democracy and growth, one would expect it to ap-
pear in cross-national empirical tests and to be at least
somewhat stable across various (plausible) robustness
tests.
While this expectation makes intuitive sense, it is nonetheless
unreliable. With respect to the relationship between democ-
racy and growth, the range of models which scholars have
regarded as potentially credible produce results ranging from
substantively and statistically significant negative effects to
similarly significant positive effects (Seawright 2010). Within
this range of results, there is no special reason to believe that
the truth lies in the middle. It might instead be the case that the
largest negative estimate produced to date in fact reflects the
causal truth; or, perhaps, a very positive estimate corresponds
with the correct model. If one model captures the structure of
the data-generating process, or one estimate is correct, then all
the others are incorrect and irrelevant. Instability across ac-
cepted specifications thus should not be seen as providing
evidence that the true relationship is weak. Such instability
only provides evidence that our consensus about how to write
down regression models is weak.
Second, the set of models which are currently regarded by
the scholarly community as plausible and which can be esti-
mated using existing data comprise a quite unusual sample
from the population of possible models for a given relation-
ship. The distinctiveness of this sample is in part healthy:
presumably, knowledge of cases and substance rules out a
range of specifications that are statistically possible but in
some sense foolish. Thus, we rarely estimate models in which
the positions of planets, for example, are taken to predict eco-
nomic performance or political institutions.
However, the extreme winnowing that produces our col-
lection of plausible models also includes less salutary forms of
selection. Some of these reflect ossified convention. For his-
torical reasons, additive models which are linear in both the
parameters and the independent variables, and which feature
an independent, additive, approximately normally distributed
error term, are our collective default for the analysis of con-
tinuous dependent variables (Stigler 1990).
Our sample of plausible models is further constrained by
the set of available indicators. While scholars sometimes cre-
ate new indicators to capture novel hypotheses that lie at the
center of their explanatory agendas, they rarely go to the same
amount of work to measure potential confounding variables.
Instead, the control variables in our plausible models are gen-
erally some subset of the current collective stock of data. Some
subset of that stock of variables becomes defined as the core
control variables, without which a model is inherently implau-
sible; this process of definition, I think, reflects in part an accu-
mulation of past findings and arguments and in part a process
of social consensus. But, regardless of the mix of these two
Assumptions are the rule, not the exception, in both de-
scriptive and causal inference in the social sciences. This fact
has long been used as a defense of the specific families of
assumptions used to make causal inferences on the basis of
regression-type models (Freedman 2004: 195). Yet the defense
is weak.  Inferences differ in terms of the strength, complexity,
plausibility, and testability of the assumptions they require.
On all of these fronts, regression-type analysis of observa-
tional data often performs so poorly that it is difficult to give
the results a persuasive causal interpretation. In what follows,
I will make this argument by showing how hard it can be to
assign causal interpretations to regression models that show
either unstable or stable results across the range of models
that the discipline considers plausible, as well as the chal-
lenges involved with drawing causal conclusions from either
the unconditional or the conditional analysis of quantitative
observational data. For these reasons, I disagree with Gerring’s
argument that the regression analysis of messy data is a good
default option for social scientists; instead, it is a weak default,
and one far more suited to describing initial facts, discovering
puzzles, and characterizing patterns than to causal inference. I
then argue that the importance of difficult-to-research ques-
tions is a weak defense of the status quo, and I conclude by
briefly sketching the valuable but carefully delimited role that
regression should play in our research.
The Trouble with Unstable Results
Gerring helpfully discusses the range of studies showing
that cross-national regressions, in particular, routinely show
unstable patterns of results across plausible specifications
regarding the most important relationships. While this diffi-
culty is by now well known, two points are nonetheless worth
emphasizing.
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